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Abstract
In 2010, the national government made drastic changes in 
nature policy in the Netherlands. The choices they made 
appeared to reflect a neo-liberal ideology, given the 
strong emphasis on private responsibility and limited 
governmental interference in nature policy. One of the 
changes was further decentralisation of nature policies 
to the provinces. This paper aims to analyse if the national 
governments changes in nature policy in 2010 resulted in a 
process of neo-liberalisation of nature policies in the twelve 
provinces in the Netherlands in the period 2010-2012.
Based on policy documents and interviews, data were 
collected on the new character of the national and twelve 
provincial nature policies. This research was carried out 
in 2011 and 2012. This data was afterwards analysed in 
a structured way, by developing a neo-liberal index and 
categorising the provinces’ policies according to this index 
by the researchers, as an experiment with systematic 
policy comparison.
The conclusion of the article is that the national 
government’s neo-liberal aspirations in 2010 are mainly 
related to deregulation, efficiency and an increase of the 
societal relevance of nature. In addition, it is clear that 
national decision affects provincial policies, but in diverse, 
even sometimes opposing, ways. Provinces are on their 
way to develop hybrid policies and practices in terms of 
neo-liberalism. In future research, it is worth to explore 
how the provincial policies develop further, and to look into 
the factors and mechanisms that cause these diversities.
Keywords: nature policy; policy change; neo liberalism; 
market-oriented policies; multi-level governance
Introduction
‘Neo-liberalism has become an important explanatory 
concept for understanding what is going on in the world’, 
as was stated by Feo (2008, p. 223). Neo-liberalism is 
commonly conceptualized as a political ideology that 
refers to four characteristics: the individual, freedom 
of choice, market security, and minimal government 
(e.g. Larner, 2000).
Nature conservation is one of the policy domains that is 
worldwide characterized by neo-liberal trends, especially 
after the financial crisis in 2008. Since the 1990s, 
the commonly applied protectionist model of nature 
conservation has been challenged by new policy 
approaches, of which many have been analysed and 
assessed for their neo-liberal characteristics (e.g. 
Dressler, 2007; Castree, 2008; Fletcher, 2010). The first 
manifestation of neo-liberal nature policy is associated 
with the introduction of private parties and markets as 
a way of regulating natural resources (Castree, 2008). 
The growing importance of economic considerations and 
instruments for nature conservation has emerged from 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 
(Rodríguez-Labajos and Martínez-Alier, 2013).
Also the European Union is encouraging neo-liberal 
practices with the approval of the European Biodiversity 
Strategy 2020, aiming to develop markets that capture 
the economic value of biodiversity and by developing 
partnerships for biodiversity with a wide variety of 
stakeholders (European Commission, 2011). This strategy 
urges to improve and streamline national, European and 
global monitoring, reporting and reviewing obligations 
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related to biodiversity objectives. To reach an overall 
perspective on these combined policy efforts poses an 
interesting challenge to comparative analysis, given the 
contextual variety of the 28 European member states.
A comparable complex situation is taking place in nature 
policy in the Netherlands. More specific, a variety of 
nature policy strategies are developed, after a new 
neo-liberal government came into power in 2010. This 
government was composed of the conservative - liberal 
party (VVD) and the Christian Democrats (CDA) as 
a ‘minority government’, which could govern with 
the support of the Party for Freedom (PVV). Presenting 
the governmental ambitions in September 2010, the 
guiding principles of this cabinet (called ‘Rutte-I’), were 
Freedom and Responsibility: the aspiration to give citizens’ 
freedom to take responsibility for their own lives and 
collective goods. 
Among other policy domains, the cabinet sets a 
transformation process in motion in nature policy that 
entailed elements that seem to reflect the neo-liberal 
ideology. Nature policy, which was formerly associated 
with a strong government, top-down and scientific, 
rational planning, was transformed in the direction of 
a reduced governmental administration and a market 
oriented and individual approach (Lower Chamber of the 
States General, 2010). This new direction has interrupted 
the decade-long stable policy strategy in the Netherlands, 
which was based on the concept of the National Ecological 
Network (NEN), which envisioned larger nature areas 
being connected in a coherent network and spanning the 
entire country, for a large part to be realized with public 
spending and by multi-level governance (see e.g. Lower 
Chamber of the States General, 2011; 2012). 
Large budget cuts and a discontinuation of the National 
Ecological Network (NEN) shocked the traditional nature 
conservation institutions (Buijs et al., 2014). This was 
combined with further decentralization of nature policy to 
the twelve provinces of the Netherlands. These provinces, 
who already had a large responsibility for implementing 
national nature policies, are, from 2010 on, more than 
before in control of the organization of the implementation 
of nature policies. However, the national government 
remains in control of the European and other international 
commitments in nature policy. Since October 2010, the 
provinces in the Netherlands have begun to act and to 
react on the new cabinets’ strategy for nature policy, 
which could lead to a certain degree of neo liberalisation 
of nature policy in the Netherlands.
The aim of this paper is to describe the impact of the 
seemingly neo-liberalized decisions at national level on 
provincial nature policies in the Netherlands. The data are 
coming from interviews and documents on the discussions 
and choices that were made by national government and 
provinces after the new decisions in nature policy of the 
between 2010 and 2012. This data was gathered as part 
of the annual policy review carried out by the Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency. To be able to analyse 
the neo-liberal transitions in national and provincial 
policies, we develop a ‘neo liberal index’ that allows 
a comparative analysis of this data.
The paper begins with a section in which we define 
neo-liberalism. In the next section we explain the 
methodology and tailor the neo-liberal concept to the 
case of nature policy. This methodology is empirically 
applied to the national and twelve provincial nature 
policies in the Netherlands in the two section thereafter. 
We conclude by reflecting on the results and by answering 
the research question.
Defining and conceptualising 
neo-liberalism
It should be emphasized that something such as ‘the’ 
neo-liberal way does not exist. Clarke (2008) assumes 
that there is no rigid neo-liberal definition, but a wide 
diversity of specific neo-liberal formations takes place. 
As Clarke (2008, p. 140) states, “Neo-liberalism does not 
and cannot exist in pure form, but only manifests itself in 
hybrid formations”. Moreover, he states that 
“Neo-liberalism does not have a static score since it is 
consistently drawn into new entanglements as it tries 
to colonize the world” (Clarke 2008, p. 141). In order 
to be able to illustrate the development of such hybrid 
formations by the use of a typology, a clear set of 
elements are to be identified. Many authors agree that 
neo-liberalism consists of several elements (Martinez and 
Garcia, 2000; Clarke, 2008; Feo, 2008). The core aspects 
that determine neo-liberalism relate to four characteristics 
indicated by Clarke (2008, 141) and are as follows:
• Market logic rationality: the rationality to organize 
human affairs as market relations;
• Calculating framework of efficiency: vocabulary, norms 
and ways of calculating value;
• Model of the self-possessed independent individual: 
people are encouraged to become independent, 
empowered individuals who take ownership; and
• Question of authority: a shift from ‘public’ authority 
towards ‘private’ authority.
In this section, we describe these characteristics.
Market logic as rationality to organize human affairs
Market logic rationality refers to the idea that the market 
has become the ideal mechanism to the service provisions 
of the state (Beeson and Firth, 1998, p.6). This ideology 
had been expressed in the managerial ideas about the state 
and public service during the time when New Public 
Management was coming into being (in the 1990s) and 
determined how relations between state and non-state 
actors are organized. Services are provided within business-
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like (principal - agent) relationships between the state and 
contract partners through, for example, the outsourcing of 
public services, new deals, framework contracts, direct 
privatization, partnerships involving finance and creating 
new markets. In addition, the instruments are used to 
create new conditions for competition and benchmarking in 
order to ensure the best service available (Clarke, 2004). 
These competitions structure the relations between service 
providers (Newman, 2010) and aspire to select the best or 
cheapest contractor to do a certain job. In addition, the 
relationship between public service and citizens becomes 
oriented by choice. Citizens are considered as consumers or 
clients who must be allowed to make choices about service 
provisions. This focuses on freedom to choose results in 
greater independence and autonomy of service users 
(Newman, 2010).
The calculating framework of efficiency
Efficiency is the guiding principle in neo-liberal policy 
strategies. Hardin (1968) argued that the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ derives from a failure to produce clear, visible 
relationships between costs and benefit, action and effects. 
Markets are therefore viewed as exceptional features of 
modern society, because markets “are expected to convert 
consumer preferences into prices, uncertainty into risk, 
need into demand, etc.” (Davies, 2010). Therefore, public 
goods should be expressed in terms of supply and 
demand, be regulated in a market as well as expressed in 
a price. In addition, Power (1997) and Clarke (2004) argue 
that neo-liberalism frames human activities in economic 
and financial terms. This implies that matters that cannot 
be interpreted in these terms are ignored or seen as less 
important. Therefore, frameworks relating to norms that 
calculate the value of common goods are established, 
often directed at affordable and feasible policies and to 
reduce public expenditure. Another aspect is managerial 
technologies that are usually associated with New Public 
Management: a series of calculative technologies 
embedded in specific practices such as budgetary 
management, auditing and targeting. These technologies 
depend upon the authority and apparent objectivity of 
disciplines such as accountancy, economics and 
management, which had risen to prominence in the 1980s 
and 1990s (MacKinnon, 2000). The expansion of 
regulatory practices such as auditing and targeting have 
since been promoted and legitimized through elaborate 
rhetoric of accountability and openness.
The model of the self-possessed independent individual
In a neoliberal regime, people are encouraged to become 
independent and empowered individuals. This is 
embedded in discourses about responsibility and 
involvement. The discourse of ‘active citizenship’ is 
prominent in neoliberal practices. Active citizenship refers 
to citizens as participants who share the responsibility for 
common solutions as well as participate in public 
consultation and planning. It also points to a view of the 
citizen as a service provider as an alternative to the state. 
This may lead to strategies that equip citizens “with the 
skills and capacities to work in partnerships with local 
governments or to take care of particular services, 
functions and sometimes the management of previously 
public resources” (Newman, 2010, p. 33). The latter may 
include practices, e.g. trainings, etc., to shape this active 
citizenship. The last aspect of the model of the self-
possessed independent individual is the tendency to 
deregulate. In order to take responsibility, the individual 
obtains the freedom to act. This demonstrates that the 
private interests of individuals as well as corporations 
matter and that burden of taxation and excess of 
regulation that interfere with freedom and 
entrepreneurship are removed (Clarke, 2004).
The question of authority: from public authority to 
private authority
As Clarke (2004) state that, in neo-liberal practices, 
the public interest is challenged as it is replaced by the 
rule of private interests which are coordinated by markets. 
In neo-liberal thought, “there is no public interest, only 
private choices” (Clarke, 2004, p. 310). This denotes 
the dissolution of the public realm with insistence on 
the primacy of the private. An additional characteristic 
is that objectives with regard to common affairs are no 
longer determined by the state, but by private actors. 
The determination of objectives concurs with a shift of 
activities, ownership and resources from the public sector 
to the private sector.
Method: the neo-liberal index
To analyse the impact of neo-liberal national decisions on 
provincial nature policies, the method of an index is used. 
An index is a measurement process that implies a non-
metric, ordinal, ordering of data (Deleon and Resnick-
Terry, 1999). The definition of neo-liberalism is used as 
a start to specify the characteristics of neo-liberalism in 
nature policy. The characteristics are translated into 
indicators that are given an ordinal value for each of the 
indicators, resulting in an opportunity to quantify and to 
compare practices among each other (Sartori, 1970; 
Collier and Mahon, 1993).
Data on national and twelve provincial nature policies was 
collected between 2010 and 2012. Provinces are: Limburg, 
North-Brabant, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland, Overijssel, 
South-Holland, North-Holland, Groningen, Friesland, 
Flevoland and Drenthe. Senior officers in charge of nature 
policy at national and provincial levels were interviewed in 
order to gain an understanding into the ways of thinking, 
speaking and acting in nature policy after the new decisions 
introduced by the cabinet Rutte-I. These conversations 
revealed existing and new discourses, visions and 
strategies of the government regarding nature policy. 
Additionally, policy documents were analysed such as:
•	 National political debates in the Parliament;
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•	  National policy documents and political communications 
(letters, etc.);
•	 Provincial debates in the council;
•	 Provincial policy documents and websites.
These documents enable understanding of the 
manifestation of intentions, planning and actual shift in 
policy practice.
It is important to specify indicators for each of the four 
characteristics of neo-liberalism to fit within the context of 
nature policy. Each of the characteristics is divided into 
indicators that are measured on a value-scale from 0 to 1, 
depending on the absence or presence of the respective 
practice (See Table 1). For instance, on the characteristic 
‘market logic in relations’, three indicators are specified. 
Considering the indicator ‘conditions for competitive 
success: competition and benchmarking’ is specified. We 
apply this indicator in each of the provinces and the 
national government. When the indicator does occur and 
is a topic of political debate, the value 1 is given. In the 
absence of the neo-liberal practice, the regional policy 
gets the value 0. The value of 0.5 is assigned in the event 
that the neo-liberal practice is not yet revealed in terms of 
instruments and practices, but the politicians discuss the 
topic and intend to develop policy instruments. For 
example, the province of Gelderland enacted a 
crowdsourcing competition what means that activities for 
competition and benchmarking exist, resulting in value 1 
on the indicator ‘conditions for competitive success: 
competition and benchmarking’. This procedure to value 
indicators is carried out for each of the provincial policies 
as well as the national policy.
To enable comparison of the neoliberal practices, the 
‘NEO-LIBERAL INDEX’ is designed which is an average 
aggregation of the indicator-values of each of the 
characteristics. National government or provinces having 
Table 1 Explanation of characteristics, indicators and values of neo-liberalism
Characteristics Indicators Value Value Value
0 0.5 1
Market logic in 
relations
Business like relationships: 
outsourcing and new business 
partnerships
Does not occur and 
is no topic in political 
debate nor is 
mentioned in policy 
documents
Does not occur, but is 
a topic of political 
debate or intention of 
the government
It occurs and is a topic of political 
debate in the government
Conditions for competitive 
success: competition and 
benchmarking
Does not occur and 
is no topic of political 
debate in the 
government
Does not occur, but is 
a topic of political 
debate or intention of 
the government
It occurs and is a topic of political 
debate in the government
A demand oriented nature: nature 
meets societal needs and citizens` 
preferences
Does not occur and 
is no topic of political 
debate in the 
government
Does not occur, but is 
a topic of political 
debate, or intention of 
the government
It occurs and is a topic of political 
debate in the government
Calculating 
framework of 
efficiency
Nature is expressed in prize and 
benefits: market and prize 
mechanisms
Does not occur and 
is no topic of political 
debate in the 
government
Does not occur, but is 
a topic of political 
debate, or intention of 
the government
It occurs and is a topic of political 
debate in the government
Affordable and feasible as leading 
principles: efficiency solutions or 
budget cuts in nature policies
Does not occur and 
is no topic of political 
debate in the 
government
Does not occur, but it 
is a topic of political 
debate or intention of 
the government
It occurs and is a topic of political 
debate in the government – no 
additional public financing from 
the government
Model of self-
possessed 
independent 
individuals
Active citizenship: citizens are 
addressed and employed as 
service providers
Does not occur and 
is no topic of political 
debate in the 
government
Does not occur, but is 
a topic of political 
debate, or intention of 
the government
It occurs and is a topic of political 
debate in the government
Enabling citizens: strategies to 
enable citizens to enlarge their 
capacity to be a service provider, 
trainings etc.
Does not occur and 
is no topic of political 
debate in the 
government
Does not occur, but is 
a topic of political 
debate, or intention of 
the government
It occurs and is a topic of political 
debate in the government
Freedom for entrepreneurial 
initiative: deregulation
Does not occur and 
is no topic of political 
debate in the 
government
Does not occur, but is 
a topic of political 
debate, or intention of 
the government
It occurs and is a topic of political 
debate in the government.
Authority: from 
public to private
Determining objectives: decision 
making with societal and private 
partners
Normal public 
consultation
Bottom up, 
government follows 
partners
Complete private decision-making, 
government is (almost) absent.
Resources and ownership: 
a transfer from public to private 
land ownership
Government controls Intermediate Privatization
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a wvalue between 0 and 0.5 on the NEO-LIBERAL INDEX 
are considered as being little to non-neo-liberal. 
If the national government or a province values 1, 
the nature conservation policy basically resembles the 
neo-liberal ideology. A value near 0 means that the policy 
is not neo-liberal at all. A value near 1 refers to a policy 
that is close to neo-liberal. Every in-between value 
illustrates that the policy regime is hybrid, having some 
neo-liberal characteristics and having some non-neo-
liberal characteristics. A hybrid practice can occur because 
an administration emphasises certain aspects and ignores 
others (for example an emphasis on market logic in 
relations, but no shift of authority, etc.), or because an 
administration develops a discourse, discussion, debate, 
but does not (yet) act on it.
Manifestation of the neo-liberal ideology 
at national level
The following section describes the neo-liberal 
characteristics of the national governmental strategy after 
the proclamation of the new cabinet Rutte-I in 2010. 
Data is coming from multiple debates that took place in 
the Parliament. (Lower Chamber of the States General, 
2011; 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2012).
Market logic in relations
A topic of debate in the Parliament was how to renew 
nature policy. This topic mainly focused on the relationship 
between the national government and the provinces. The 
national government decides to decentralize nature policy 
towards the provinces. On the indicator business like 
relationships: outsourcing and new business partnerships, 
it is clear that the provinces have been in charge of 
implementing national policy targets for some years by 
detailed outsourcing contracts containing targets on, for 
example, the purchase, design and management of 
specified amounts of hectares of land for the National 
Ecological Network. With the decentralization, these 
contracts are discontinued. From 2010 on, the provinces 
are in charge of the organization and the implementation 
of the remaining National Ecological Network. The 
provinces have to realize these national objectives with 
budgets provided by the national government. The way 
to guarantee that provinces realize and account for these 
objectives is a topic of debate. Nevertheless, the European 
Union still considers the Netherlands national government 
as being responsible for achieving European nature goals. 
The new situation does not result in renewing the business 
like relationships between national and provincial 
governments, for example by renewing outsourcing 
contracts with each individual province, resulting in a value 
0.5 in terms of establishing business like relationships: 
outsourcing and new business relations (value 0.5).
Related to the indicator conditions for competitive 
success: competition and benchmarking or mechanisms 
for competition such as tenders on nature management 
for actors or societal parties, the national government 
does not take action or launches activities (value 0), 
which might be explained because national government 
does not consider itself as having an active role in nature 
management; this task is decentralized to regional 
governments.
In terms of a the indicator demand oriented nature: 
nature meets societal needs and citizens’ preferences, 
the cabinet’s new direction in nature policy is based on 
the assumption that the public did not benefit from nor 
support the ‘old’ nature policy as it was considered too 
technocratic, too expensive, and hampering business 
development. Since the operational responsibility to 
develop and manage nature lies with the provinces, 
the national government does aim for demand oriented 
nature, but does not actively participate in strategies to 
discover the preferences of society (value 0.5). Analysis 
of these three aspects illustrates that the cabinet Rutte-I 
appears to be weak in terms of neo-liberalism on the 
aspect of ‘market logic in relations’.
Aggregating these indicator values results in a value 0.33 
with regard to market logic in relations, which means that 
the national government is not considered to be neo-
liberal on this aspect (see Figure 1).
Calculating framework of efficiency
At the national level, many political parties emphasize the 
value of nature for the economy, public health, housing 
values, attractive business surroundings etc. They 
express that nature should be less of a public affair and 
financed more through society. The idea that nature is 
expressed in terms of price and benefits and is regulated 
by the market and by prize mechanisms is thus a topic of 
national discussion. The discourse that nature policy is 
legitimized by its benefits to people who should also be 
willing to contribute financially is widely accepted at the 
national level by both the cabinet parties as well as the 
other political parties. However, expressing nature in 
monetary terms is not yet a national practice, even 
though some politicians suggest ideas such as to 
introduce entrance fees for nature parks. Instruments to 
commercialize nature are not developed at the national 
level (value 0.5).
The cabinet parties CDA and VVD considered nature policy 
as having excessively burdened public spending, due to 
the unrealistic ambitions of the ecological network. They 
propose that available finances must become prevalent 
over ambitions. Affordable and feasible policy is a leading 
principle, including the indicator efficiency solutions or 
budget cuts in nature policies. The new cabinet does not 
invest in management technologies based on efficiency 
and performance management, but the nature policy 
budget was dramatically slashed, by 42%, as part of the 
reduction of the public expenditure (value 0.5).
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Aggregating these indicator values results in a value 0.5 
on the aspect of the calculating framework in efficiency, 
which is clearly the most neo-liberal aspect of national 
nature policy (see Figure 1).
Model of the self-possessed independent individual
The cabinet Rutte-I expresses a discourse of active 
citizenship, which is the indicator active citizenship: 
citizens are addressed and employed as service providers. 
Political debates show the ideology that society must be 
able to tell how to preserve and maintain nature and to 
take a role in it. This is economically motivated (VVD) and 
combined with arguments that government institutions 
have a pampered society (PVV). In addition, farmers are 
considered the best service providers to manage nature 
(CDA). In order to achieve active citizenship, the national 
government reduces the public expenditure for nature. 
Active citizenship is a topic of the national debate, but 
stimulating this active citizenship, however, is to be 
executed by regional governments (value 0.5). 
Furthermore, the national government does not discuss 
nor takes actions to enable citizens related to strategies 
to enable citizens to enlarge their capacity to be a service 
provider (value 0).
Deregulation: freedom for entrepreneurial initiative refers 
to spatial planning regimes that have, thus far, regulated 
activities of other (economic) functions within or close to 
natural areas. In the Netherlands, these regimes have 
resulted in conflicts between nature conservationists and 
farmers regarding European nature reserves (Natura 2000 
areas). According to the cabinet, the National Ecological 
Network claims land that is currently in use for agricultural 
production, what therefore affected agricultural business 
development. Deregulation aims to remove these 
impediments and prevent nature policy to harm private 
interests, mainly those of farmers. Therefore, the cabinet 
decides to reduce the amount of land that is spatially 
claimed for nature development and return the land to 
farmers, which is the traditional electorate of the CDA. 
Additionally, the cabinet modifies and simplifies national 
nature conservation law, for example, by reducing the list 
of protected species (value 1). Together, these indicators 
result in a value 0.5 on the aspect model of self-possessed 
independent individuals (see Figure 1)
Authority: from public to private
Especially with regard to nature management, the cabinet 
intends to shift authority and responsibility from existing 
governmental institutions towards society. The cabinet’s 
intention is a cheaper nature management and the 
promotion of societal involvement in managing nature, 
carried out by farmers, volunteers and societal 
organizations instead of public service.
It is the cabinet’s ideology that nature is to become a 
private matter. The cabinet party CDA states that farmers 
can be just as efficient in attending to nature as can 
ecological professionals. The perception is that farmland 
is nature land as well and should be treated as equal 
to nature reserves that are managed by professional 
institutes. VVD, on the other hand, argues that public 
expenditure on nature is excessive. Available budgets 
rather than biodiversity goals should be a guide in 
developing nature policy. However, the national 
government is still responsible for the European nature 
obligations, realizing the Nature 2000 network. This 
demonstrates that nature is still considered a public 
responsibility due to European legislation. Decision making 
in the early period of Rutte-I occurred between national 
and provincial governments. There is no evidence at the 
national level that the private sector is involved in decision 
making, let alone a transfer of power toward a complete 
private determination of objectives and decision making. 
On the contrary, the traditional societal partners were 
ignored during the period of transition, resulting in the 
value 0 on the indicator determining objectives: decision 
making with societal and private partners.
The idea of commercialization plays a role in national 
political debates. It is intended that finance comes from 
the private sector and the amount of nature under public 
management is reduced by canceling national ecological 
corridors. The discussion at the national level includes new 
ownership of nature land, ‘giving nature back to individuals’ 
(CDA) and encourages commercial combinations with 
nature. A shift of ownership to the private sector 
(ownership) is, therefore, visible at national level, resulting 
in a value 1 on the indicator resources and ownership: a 
transfer from public to private land ownership (value 1).
On the aspect of authority, the combination of these two 
indicators results in a value 0.5 (see Figure 1).
Neo-liberal manifestation of national governmental 
practices
From the analysis of national governmental practices, it 
can be concluded that the national governmental strategy 
can be labelled as ‘neo-liberal’ particularly on the aspects 
of calculating framework of efficiency and the model of the 
self possessed individual. The high value of the calculating 
framework of efficiency can be explained by the leading 
discourse of the cabinet, ‘affordable and feasible’, which 
the cabinet realizes by enacting budget cuts in nature 
policy and by reducing the ambitions for the ecological 
network in order to meet the available finances. The high 
value of the aspect of the model of the self-possessed 
individual is largely due to deregulation and the reduction 
of the amount of land on which a nature claim lies in order 
to reduce the effects on farmers. Despite this, and the 
intention to reduce the amount of nature under public 
responsibility, there is a relatively low value on the aspect 
of the shift of authority from public to private. This can be 
explained by the lack of involvement of private and 
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societal partners in the decision making of the national 
government. On the aspect of market logic relations, 
it is revealed that, despite the cabinets` aspiration to 
make others more responsible for nature policies; it does 
not invest in establishing new business like relationships 
to enact this (Figure 1).
Manifestation of the neo-liberal ideology 
at regional government levels
A comparison is made between the nature policy 
strategies of Netherlands regional governments in 
response to the neo-liberal actions of the cabinet. In all 
provinces there have been reactions to the declaration of 
nature policy changes by the cabinet Rutte-I. These are 
public statements, political communications or new policy 
agendas. Some provinces have started to act on the new 
course; others are merely reacting, opposing or 
reconsidering their policies (see e.g. Province Drenthe, 
2012; Province Gelderland, 2012; Province Groningen 
2012, 2012a; Province Friesland, 2012; Province Limburg, 
2012, Province Overijssel, 2012; Province North-Brabant, 
2012; Province North-Holland, 2012; Province Utrecht , 
2012; Province Zeeland, 2012; Province South-Holland, 
2012).
Market logic in relations
After the proclamation of the cabinet Rutte-I, all provinces 
are faced with large budget cuts, and have to reconsider 
the direction of their nature policies. With respect to the 
first indicator, business like relationships: outsourcing and 
new business partnerships, it can be observed that some 
of the provinces already had experiences with outsourcing 
some of the tasks to professional partners. Activities that 
have recently become part of outsourcing to private actors 
are land exchange and land development for the National 
Ecological Network (Limburg- value 1, Gelderland- value 
1) and collaborative financial investments (North-Holland- 
value 1). In addition, a shift has been observed in the 
types of outsourcing relations. Businesslike relations such 
as co-financing constructions are increasing as well as 
activities to commission private parties, including 
consultant agencies or expert teams to perform certain 
tasks (North-Brabant –value 1). South-Holland, Flevoland, 
Drenthe and Zeeland intend to continue or increase 
outsourcing activities, often financially motivated, but at 
the time of our research this was not implemented yet 
(value 0.5). Also, Groningen, Friesland and Utrecht 
develop partnership with society by requesting societal 
partners to contribute and co-finance nature development 
and management. However, at the moment of the 
research, these provinces did not make an explicit choice 
about how to set-up these partnerships (value 0.5). 
Overijssel, at the time of this research, does not express 
an intention for new co-financing constructions or new 
outsourcing tasks for the realization of the National 
Ecological Network (value 0).
Creating conditions for competitive success by using 
benchmarking or mechanisms to increase competition 
between parties in nature conservation is another neo-
liberal indicator. Limburg intends to evaluate a nature 
management subsidy scheme based on the best quality 
delivered (value 0.5), while North-Brabant is willing to 
commission activities to the most efficient partnership 
(value 0.5). Also South Holland, as part of an extensive 
exploration on how to realize goals more efficiently, 
intends to use tenders (value 0.5). Gelderland wants 
to select suitable partners to lead nature projects, based 
on criteria such as proven capability and local support 
(value 0.5). Gelderland also experiments with a (small 
scale) crowd sourcing competition among citizens as 
a component of its nature and landscape strategy 
consultation. Gelderland selected the best citizen idea 
to support with public money. North-Holland, Friesland, 
Overijssel, Utrecht, Flevoland, Drenthe, Zeeland, 
Groningen do not yet express an intention or instruments 
to increase competition or benchmarking among private 
parties in nature conservation (value 0).
Almost all provinces decide to focus their remaining state 
budgets on realizing the international goals in their (often 
reduced) ecological networks. Analysis reveals that some 
provinces more than others perceive nature conservation 
a way to meet societal preferences and that they should 
develop a more demand oriented nature, in which nature 
meets societal needs and citizens’ preferences. 
This results in an aim to detect citizens’ preferences, 
for example, with surveys (North-Holland, Utrecht, 
Gelderland) and dialogue (North-Holland). The provinces 
Gelderland, North-Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, North-
Brabant, South-Holland and Overijssel value 0.5: they 
recognise areas in which ecological values are top priority, 
while in other areas, nature should fit more with the needs 
of citizens, allowing more recreational use and 
combinations of nature with other societal functions. 
For example, South Holland chooses to invest provincial 
budgets in recreational areas more than in nature 
reserves. The areas in which ecological goals are top 
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priority are reduced to the international nature goals. 
Utrecht opts to base its new policy on different nature 
perspectives, ranging from ecological to mixed used areas. 
The provinces Groningen and Friesland emphasise that the 
ecological value of their remaining ecological structures is 
the basis for their choices, despite that they also express 
the wish to combine this with other societal goals, but at 
the time of the transition, they have not yet invested in 
realizing demand oriented nature types (value 0.5). 
Overijssel and Gelderland prioritise the ecological network 
for ecological goals, and outside these areas want to make 
space for more combinations with societal functions 
(value 0.5). The other provinces consider the ecological 
function most important: choices about nature types or 
management schemes remain primarily determined by 
biodiversity improvement, as is decided by the public 
government. The provinces that consider biodiversity 
values as the main guiding principle for choices in nature 
conservation are Limburg, Drenthe and Flevoland (value 0).
The aggregation of values for market logic in relations 
clarifies that the neo-liberal Market Logic is introduced in 
relations between the provincial government and partners 
in Gelderland (0.66) and North-Brabant (0.66). The 
provinces with the least neo-liberal market logic relations 
are Overijssel (0.16), Drenthe (0.16) and Flevoland (0.16) 
(Figure 2).
Calculating framework of efficiency
Following the cabinet’s discourse, a shift is observed 
regarding the indicator nature is expressed in prize and 
benefits: market and prize mechanisms. Some provinces 
emphasize the value of nature for the economy as well 
as society. These provinces use valuation of nature to 
legitimize nature by its benefits to people as an argument 
to convince other (non-institutional) stakeholders to take 
responsibility for nature management and nature 
conservation. From the political debates at regional 
government levels, it appears that the value of nature 
for public health, housing values, attractive business 
surroundings are emphasized equally or even more 
than the intrinsic value of nature and species. North-
Brabant and Gelderland intend to evaluate the economic 
value of nature for private actors in order to induce 
fundraising (value 0.5). Instruments to achieve this 
include green funds, regional bank accounts for nature 
projects or green investments. Also other provinces such 
as South-Holland, Utrecht and Groningen agree to 
investigate new instruments to collect money (value 0.5). 
Groningen is looking for a way to develop a regional fund 
to which companies contribute because of the money they 
raised by using nature. The other provinces currently 
value 0 on the indicator nature is expressed in benefits 
and prize: market and prize mechanisms.
With regard to the indicator affordable and feasible as 
leading principles: efficiency solutions or budget cuts in 
nature policies, almost all provinces have re-assessed 
their ecological networks, often motivated by efficiency 
arguments. Their shared strategy is to earmark the 
remaining budgets toward the most relevant nature 
areas and to find less expensive options for nature 
management. Affordable and feasible has become a 
leading principle of nature policies in some provinces, 
such as Gelderland, South Holland and Overijssel. South 
Holland follows the national strategy and cuts budgets 
full heartedly and no extra public (provincial) spending 
for nature remains (value 1). Gelderland, Limburg and 
Overijssel follow the same argument, but do invest extra 
provincial budget (value 0.5). Also other provinces state 
they have to deal with the national budget cuts and 
emphasize that it is now time to look for more efficient 
ways to realize nature (Friesland, Utrecht, Groningen, 
value 0.5). Drenthe did not re-assess the ecological 
network in the period 2010 and 2012, although we know 
that it was being forced to do so in 2013, because of 
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limited budgets. Drenthe aimed to manage the same 
surface, but was looking for more affordable types of 
nature (value 0.5). Zeeland did re-asses the ecological 
network, but keeps on contributing to nature by extra 
provincial means (value 0.5). The province of Flevoland 
does not develop strategies to adapt the planning of their 
nature responsibilities to new budgetary limits, but 
chooses to fight the national government’s decision to 
cease the co-financing of the national ecological corridor 
in the province (value 0). Also, North-Brabant does not 
re-asses its ecological network (value 0). North-Holland 
did re-asses the ecological network even before the 
cabinet’s policy changes based on the argument of efficacy 
and feasibility. The province did not re-assess again after 
2010 and did not decrease budgets in addition to national 
governmental budgets (value 0.5).
Manifestation of calculating frameworks of efficiency 
among regional governments in total reveals that South 
Holland (0.75) shows the highest value. Most provinces 
receive an intermediate value in this aspect (0.25). 
Only Flevoland (0) does not consider efficiency as a 
central aspect in their nature policy strategy (Figure 3).
The model of the self-possessed independent individual 
With regard to the indicator active citizenship: citizens are 
addressed and employed as service providers, it can be 
witnessed that most provinces aim to increase active 
citizenship. Overijssel and Gelderland create a spatial 
zone in which private initiatives (including citizens) are 
welcomed that combine economic development with 
nature management and quality improvement for water, 
nature and landscape (value 1). Analysis reveals that 
North-Brabant (value 0.5) focuses in their discussion more 
on private companies as potential contributors to the 
execution of nature policies than on citizens. 
South Holland addresses the responsibility of society, but 
hardly addresses citizens (value 0.5). North-Holland 
(value 1) focuses more on social organizations and 
Limburg (value 1), traditionally, on volunteers for nature 
management. Zeeland (value 1) and Drenthe (value 1) 
also rely on active citizenship as valuable and necessary 
for nature management. Gelderland, Utrecht and 
Overijssel ask citizens to contribute to nature policy, 
for example by developing and managing ecological 
structures. These provinces are open to accept new nature 
types, nature activities and commercial combinations that 
were not previously considered. These three provinces 
incorporate this intention into their policy plans and 
develop instruments or actions to invite citizens to 
contribute to nature development and management. 
Utrecht considers giving citizens a greater role in the 
development and management of natural areas and 
to stimulate active citizenship, but at the time of this 
research this was not implemented yet (value 0.5). 
The provinces of Flevoland and Groningen do not express 
the intention to invite citizens for new initiatives (value 0). 
Friesland does see the need to rely on more private 
arrangements for the realization and management of 
nature (due to financial difficulties) but not specifically 
citizens (value 0).
The indicator enabling citizens: strategies to enable 
citizens to enlarge their capacity to be a service provider, 
for instance by trainings show a variety of developments 
among the provinces. Tools and strategies to enable 
citizens to develop self-possession strategies vary among 
the provinces. Limburg has developed a ‘learning 
company’ (value 1); North-Holland utilizes a wide range 
of tools to involve citizens and companies, depending on 
the process, the objectives as well as the desires of 
the citizens themselves (design atelier, newsletters, 
co-decision in steering groups) (value 1). Drenthe has set 
up a citizens’ panel to explore what people think and want 
from nature. Private initiatives to manage nature are 
encouraged (value 1). North-Brabant also stimulates 
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individuals to determine what they want with nature 
by participation processes and dialogues (value 0.5). 
Gelderland intends to create new structures such as 
dialogue, pilot projects, think tanks and knowledge 
networks in which citizens are allowed and encouraged to 
participate in order to increase societal involvement and 
ownership, but in practice it appears hard to realize (value 
0.5). Utrecht intends to invest in knowledge and training 
of volunteers and education. This is, in the period 
2010-2012 an intention that is not yet implemented 
(value 0.5). Certain provinces such as Flevoland are less 
innovative in developing new strategies for active 
citizenship (value 0). Groningen does develop new nature 
policies together with societal partners but does not intend 
to invest in capacity building for active citizenship (value 
0). Overijssel intends to invest actively in capacity 
building. During the period that we look at, this was not 
yet put into practice (value 0.5). Friesland, Zeeland and 
South-Holland do not intend to invest in capacity building 
for self-organization of citizens (value 0).
A neo-liberal regime includes less regulation and more 
freedom for entrepreneurial initiative, which is expressed 
through the indicator freedom for entrepreneurial 
initiative: deregulation. It is observed that due to the 
decentralization and cuts in the budgets coming from 
the national government, all provinces were forced to 
restructure and decrease their planned ecological 
structures, resulting in diminishing the area regulated by 
nature policy. However, Flevoland and North-Brabant have 
refused to do this and have maintained the original size of 
nature as being the focus of nature policy. The decrease of 
the ecological network in almost all provinces reduces the 
side-effects of claims on land by nature. Consequently, the 
farmers benefit. Groningen, Limburg, Zeeland, Drenthe, 
South-Holland, Gelderland en Utrecht and Friesland value 
1 because they have decreased their area size of nature 
policy, thereby reducing nature claims on agricultural 
lands. Overijssel makes this argument more explicit (value 
1); the reduction of the ecological structure and provincial 
money for nature is also motivated by being able to sell 
out farmers. North-Holland has stated that it wants 
to transform nature policy into a less complex and 
fragmented policy field, aiming to reduce the large 
amount of rules (value 0.5). North-Brabant states to 
simplify the procedures for subsidies (value 0.5), as well 
as Flevoland, who enacted the simplified subsidy program 
in January 2011 (value 1). Limburg and Zeeland have 
reduced the area size, being the focus of nature policy, 
but did not transform or simplified additional rules (value 
0.5). Limburg argues the rules are needed for nature 
policy. Zeeland argues that a continuous shift in rules is 
hampering on the ground activities.
The aggregation of the neo-liberal indicators for the 
‘self-possessed individual’ illustrates that most provinces 
can be considered quite neo-liberal in this aspect. North 
Holland, Drenthe and Limburg values the highest. 
Friesland and Groningen are the least neo-liberal on this 
aspect (Figure 4).
Authority: from public to private
Despite the need of most provinces to search for alternative 
(private) finances, they continue to emphasize that nature 
is a public good.
None of the provinces allow private partners to 
autonomously determine nature objectives. Therefore, the 
provincial values in the indicator determining objectives: 
decision making with societal and private partners are also 
intermediate. However, there are certain provinces that 
highly involve their private and societal partners in nature 
policy development. Groningen, Utrecht, Gelderland, 
Drenthe and Friesland use Manifests that were created by 
their societal partners as the basis for new policies (value 
0.5). Overijssel first decided on a new policy from a top 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Gelderland Groningen South-
Holland
Utrecht Friesland Overijssel Limburg North-
Holland
Drenthe Zeeland North-
Brabant
Flevoland
Model of self-possessed independent individuals
Le
ve
l o
f 
ne
o-
lib
er
al
is
m
Figure 4 Values of the provinces on the model of the self-possessed independent individual
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down perspective, but is then forced by the public reaction 
to co-create the new policy together with societal partners 
(value 0.5). North-Brabant and North-Holland also actively 
invite citizens to develop ideas to integrate into their 
policies (value 0.5) and also coordinate interactive town 
hall meetings. Other provinces are developing new policies 
conform institutional consultation procedures (South-
Holland, Limburg, Flevoland, Zeeland – value 0).
And finally analysing the indicator Resources and 
ownership: a transfer from public to private land 
ownership, it becomes clear that North-Brabant, 
Gelderland, Utrecht, Overijssel, Friesland, Groningen and 
South Holland are willing to shift toward new private 
ownership, for example to allow more farmers to own and 
manage nature land (value 0.5). North-Holland uses the 
adagio that ‘the one who pays determines’ or ‘that the one 
who benefits pays’ (value 0.5) and is aiming to set up 
‘sponsorship construction’. In Drenthe, nature is 
considered as joint ownership (value 0.5). Limburg 
continues to take ownership but stimulates municipalities, 
which are also governmental actors, to contribute (value 
0). Flevoland did not express the intention to increase 
private ownership (value 0). However, no complete shift 
towards private funding is expected in the aspect of shift 
of ownership.
The aggregation of aspects of ‘Authority: from public to 
private’ illustrates that Gelderland, Utrecht, Friesland, 
Overijssel, North-Holland and North-Brabant are moderate 
neo-liberal on this aspect with a value 0.5. Limburg, 
Zeeland and Flevoland are non-neo-liberal with regard to 
this characteristic (Figure 5). South-Holland has a value 
of 0.25 on this characteristic.
The neo-liberal index is employed to identify the neo-
liberal characteristics in provincial nature policy 
strategies and to determine if they are neo-liberal or 
merely hybrids (Figure 6). The figure reveals three 
groups of provinces. The first group are the provinces 
that have most neo-liberal characteristics. These 
provinces should have a value on the neo-liberal index 
between 0.66 and 1. None of the provinces have reached 
this value, meaning that this group is empty. The second 
group are provinces that are considered as hybrids, 
having some neo-liberal characteristics or intending to 
develop neo-liberal practices and on the other hand, 
having some more conservative practices, such as 
Gelderland, North-Holland, North-Brabant, Utrecht, 
South-Holland, Limburg, Overijssel, Groningen, Drenthe 
and Friesland. The third group are provinces, such as 
Flevoland and Zeeland, with more conservative and 
traditional characteristics, having a value on the neo-
liberal index between 0 and 0.33.
Discussion
This paper has analysed the effect of neo-liberal 
aspirations from the cabinet Rutte-I on nature policies in 
the twelve provinces in the Netherlands (2010-2012) by 
using a neo-liberal index. It has been possible to specify 
the new neo-liberal practices of national government and 
to compare the neo-liberal differences among the twelve 
provincial nature policies. Although the decisions during 
the administration of Rutte-I were perceived to be abrupt 
and very right wing, the analysis has indicated that the 
national nature policy is very much a hybrid in terms of 
neo-liberalism. This means that some new neo-liberal 
elements emerged, but it could not be considered as a full 
neo-liberal policy as such. Strong neo-liberal aspects of 
the new national nature strategy are deregulation, the 
discourse of efficiency and a transfer from public to 
private land ownership. The other neo-liberal aspects such 
as conditions for competitive success and strategies to 
enable citizens for self-possession and determining 
objectives by private partners receive much less attention 
in the renewed national strategy.
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The question was whether these neo-liberal aspirations 
of national government affected provincial nature policies 
in a neo-liberal way. It is concluded that national policy 
change forces changes on provinces which leads overall 
to new practices in all provinces. But the analysis clearly 
shows that provinces did formulate nature policies with 
a specific character, which were more neo-liberal than 
national government in some provinces and less neo-
liberal in other provinces. Because provincial governments 
are now in charge of developing and implementing nature 
policy, they have more freedom to develop their own 
policy, according to their own aspirations, resulting in 
a wide variety. The analysis reveals that real neo-liberal 
provinces do not occur according to the index. Neo-liberal 
hybrid governments are in development in six provinces 
(Gelderland, North-Holland, North-Brabant, Utrecht, 
South-Holland, Drenthe, Overijssel, Groningen, Limburg, 
Friesland). In the meantime, two provinces hardly reveal 
any neo-liberal aspirations Flevoland and Zeeland. During 
the period of research, they remained more than others in 
favour of a nature policy based primarily conservation by 
public and governmental organisations. This ranking is 
determined by the way of threshold-setting (index value 
groups: 1 to 0,66; 0,66 to 0,33; 0,33 to 0). However, the 
seven provinces in group two still show many differences 
among each other. Gelderland is considerably more 
neo-liberal compared to Friesland. Even provinces with 
the same value, as for instance Utrecht and South-
Holland, are neo liberal on different aspects, for example 
South Holland is more neo-liberal on the characteristic 
calculating framework of efficiency, compared to Utrecht 
that scores high on the model of self-possessed 
independent individuals.
It is worth discussing the explanations of the diversity 
between provinces. It is clear that provinces collectively are 
more neo-liberal than the national government on aspects 
as business-like relations and on shared public-private 
decision-making with their (regional) partners. A possible 
explanation is a closer relation of the provincial government 
with local private actors compared to the national 
policymakers. In regard to developing management 
technologies (i.e. looking for new instruments and 
strategies to deal with the budget cuts in, for example, 
nature management) provinces value higher and actually 
put the (national) ideas into practice. This can be explained 
by the decentralization. In this case, the possible 
explanation is also that provincial governments felt the 
urgency to explore alternative ways to finance nature 
policy. Deregulation values are also relatively neo-liberal in 
all provinces because all were practically forced to 
reconsider nature regulation and to partly abandon their 
ecological networks due to national budget cuts, thereby 
reducing the spatial claims of nature on agricultural land.
The unilateral and abrupt way of national government’s 
policy change might also have resulted in resistance and 
reluctance by some provinces to change their way of doing 
nature policy over the last 20 years. During the period in 
which the data for this research were collected, the 
changes were still fresh and negotiations took place 
between national and provincial governments on policies 
and budgets. In further analysis, it could be interesting to 
explore the further developments of provincial policies and 
explore explaining factors of the diversity that is visible, 
which might be found in the political ideology of the 
provincial governments, the total budget available for 
provincial policies or the type of nature available in the 
provinces amongst others.
To close the discussion, it is worth to reflect on the 
success of national policymakers’ desire for more 
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Figure 6 Neo-liberal index of the provinces
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efficiency and deregulation. The analysis clearly reveals 
that diversity has increased strongly in provincial nature 
policies, as well has complexity since every province was 
setting their own policy framework. Would the national 
decision have had more impact if the decentralisation was 
jointly discussed and explored instead of being unilaterally 
implemented without any preparatory debate?
Conclusion
Following our analysis, the conclusion is that a shift 
towards neo-liberalism was visible between 2010 and 
2012 from a nature policy largely dominated by the public 
domain, towards a more societal nature policy. Efficiency 
and cost reduction were important motivations for the new 
policies; however, what is lacking thus far is a shift from 
public to private authority. It remains that provinces are 
the leading actors in determining policy. They coordinate 
shared decision-making processes, sometimes following 
initiatives of partners. They invite citizens and private 
parties to realize nature projects in specific spatial zones 
for which they set the participation rules. Although nature 
is legitimized by its benefits to people, it is not yet 
consequentially regulated in the market and expressed in 
a price. So what remains, even after the administration 
of Rutte-I fell in 2012 and is followed by a more left wing 
administration (Rutte-II, a combination of the 
conservative liberal party VVD and the social democratic 
party PvdA), is the conviction that nature policy is not 
merely a public domain but is currently far from being a 
private matter. Looking at these practices in more detail, 
it is concluded that a wide variety of practices are seen 
among provinces, for instance business-like relations, 
outsourcing of land exchange and land development 
to private actors, collaborative financial investments, 
or consultants performing certain tasks. Another example 
is the way active citizenship is increased, as for instance 
creating a spatial zone in which private initiatives are 
welcomed or by giving citizens a larger role in 
the development and managing nature areas.
To come to an end, we explore the value of the method 
for future practices. The method is expected to be a 
valuable monitoring tool that enables to analyse progress 
and policy changes over time, when carried out 
periodically. Therefore, it is recommended to repeat 
the procedure periodically. The process of nature policy 
development has continued after the fall of Rutte-I, both 
at national and provincial levels. While the ideology 
‘affordable and feasible’ is less prominent in the policy of 
Rutte-II, it has continued the ideology of active citizenship 
and a more societal embedded nature policy. Also, at the 
provincial level, the balance between the neo-liberal 
aspects is a continuous search, in which each province 
makes different choices. And last, it is worth to 
experiment with the tool to understand the success of the 
provincial nature policy, in other words, to use the method 
in policy evaluation, since it is expected that the method 
allows identifying practices that contribute to successful or 
unsuccessful nature policy in terms of goal achievement. 
The Qualitative Comparative Analysis tools of Ragin are 
suitable to carry out this type of policy evaluations.
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